Educational integration of asylum-seeking and refugee children in Belgium: country report for the ERF project INTEGRACE by Ingleby, David & Derluyn, Ilse






In this article, I present two conceptual problems for Craver’s mutual manipula-
bility account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms. First, constitutive relevance
threatens to imply causal relevance despite Craver (and Bechtel)’s claim that they are
strictly distinct. Second, if (as is intuitively appealing) parthood is defined in terms of
spatio-temporal inclusion, then the mutual manipulability account is prone to counter-
examples, as I show by a case of endosymbiosis. I also present a methodological problem
(a case of experimental underdetermination) and formulate two partial, but fallible
solutions based on the notions of parthood and synchronicity.
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1 Introduction
The concept of ‘complex-system mechanism’ plays an increasingly important
role in philosophy of science (and in philosophy of the special sciences in
particular). It is commonly defined such that a mechanism’s higher level
behavior is realized by the organized behavior of its lower level parts
(Glennan [1996], [2002]; Machamer et al. [2000]; Bechtel and Abrahamsen
[2005]). This general characterization gives rise to two questions. First, how
should these lower level behaviors be characterized? One of the most popular
answers is that they can be described by Woodward-style invariant general-
izations (Glennan [2002]; Woodward [2002]; Craver [2006], [2007]; Leuridan
[2010]). Second, what is the ‘realization’ relation between the lower and the
higher level?1 A well-known answer is that this relation is constitutive, not
causal (Craver and Bechtel [2007]).
In his book Explaining the Brain, Craver explicitly adopts Woodward’s
account of causation ([2007], Chapter 3) and he proposes a ‘mutual manipu-
lability’ account of constitutive relations (Chapter 4). This is perhaps the best
and the most elaborate account of mechanisms available today. Yet in this
article, I will show that it is problematic in several respects. In Sections 5–7,
I present two main conceptual problems. Either constitutive relevance implies
causal relevance (contra Craver and Bechtel [2007]) or we need a set of prin-
cipled reasons why no cases of constitutive relevance are also cases of causal
relevance. This I will call Problem #1 (Section 5). In my opinion, the best way
to solve Problem #1 would be to focus on the notion of parthood. However,
given a very natural definition of parthood (in terms of spatio-temporal in-
clusion), plenty of cases of bidirectional causation would unintentionally fit
the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance, as I will illustrate
by means of the endosymbiosis of aphids and Buchnera. This I will call
Problem #2 (Section 6). In Section 7, I consider some possible ways out of
this problem. In Sections 9–12, I discuss a methodological problem, the prob-
lem of underdetermination (which I will call Problem #3): it may be hard to
distinguish between constitutive relevance and bidirectional causation on the
basis of experimental evidence. I first present the problem and distinguish it
from a related problem Craver discusses (Section 9). Then I present two par-
tial, but fallible solutions to the problem of underdetermination, based on the
notions of parthood (Section 10) and synchronicity (Section 11). Finally,
I reject the suggestion that pragmatic considerations could help to solve the
problem of underdetermination (Section 12). In Section 13, I briefly discuss
the consequences of these three problems for those who try to characterize
mechanisms in terms of Woodwardian invariant relations. The other sections
1 I use ‘realization’ in a loose sense here, not in Jaegwon Kim’s sense (see Craver [2007],
pp. 212–3).
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serve to present the main concepts used: ‘Mechanisms’ (Section 2),
‘Invariance’ (Section 3), ‘Mutual manipulability’ (Section 4), and ‘Interlevel
experiments’ (Section 8).
2 Mechanisms
Craver defines a mechanism as ‘a set of entities and activities organized such
that they exhibit the phenomenon to be explained’ (Craver [2007], p. 5).
He continues as follows: ‘Entities are the components or parts in mechanisms.
They have properties that allow them to engage in a variety of activities. [. . .]
Activities are the causal components in mechanisms. [. . .] Finally, the entities
and activities in mechanisms are organized together spatially, temporally,
causally, and hierarchically [. . .] The behavior of the mechanism as a whole
requires the organization of its components [. . .]’ (Craver [2007], pp. 5–6).
For Craver, the explanandum phenomenon plays a central role in the above
definition. ‘As Kauffman (1971) and Glennan (1996, 2002) argue, mechanisms
are always mechanisms of a given phenomenon. The boundaries of mechan-
isms – what is in the mechanism and what is not – are fixed by reference to the
phenomenon that the mechanism explains’ (Craver [2007], pp. 122–3, original
emphasis). Craver occasionally calls the idea that all mechanisms are mech-
anisms of or for something, ‘Glennan’s law’; cf. (Glennan [2002], p. S344) for
a statement of this view.
As is evident from this definition, a mechanism consists of two levels.
At the micro-level, there are the mechanism’s entities and activities which
are organized together spatially, temporally, and causally. At the macro-level,
there is the phenomenon to be explained: the behavior of the mechanism as a
whole.2 What is important is that for Craver, all causal relations are intralevel.
Interlevel relations, in contrast, are constitutive, not causal.
3 Intralevel Causal Relations and Invariance
How does Craver characterize a mechanism’s intralevel causal relations?
Craver’s definition of ‘mechanism’ derives from Machamer, Darden, and
Craver’s highly influential paper (MDC), which treats mechanisms as ‘entities
and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from
start or set-up to finish or termination conditions’’ ([2000], p. 3). One of the
central tenets of the MDC account is that it is the activities that account for
the causing. But in an Anscombian vein, they refuse to give a general account
of their causal nature: ‘Activities are types of causes. Terms like “cause” and
2 The distinction between the micro- and the macro-level is not absolute. It is relative to the
mechanism at hand. Levels of mechanisms are not monolithic divisions in nature (Craver
[2007], p. 190). For a related view, see (Bechtel [2008], pp. 143–8).
Problems for Mutual Manipulability 401
“interact” are abstract terms that need to be specified with a type of activity
and are often so specified in typical scientific discourse.’ (Machamer et al.
[2000], p. 6)
Yet Craver’s views about causation have changed drastically since then.
Since a couple of years ago, he understands the causal nature of activities
in terms of Woodward’s manipulationist account (Craver [2006], p. 372).3
He describes this account as follows:4
‘The central idea is that causal relationships are distinctive in that they
are potentially exploitable for the purposes of manipulation and control.
More specifically, variable X is causally relevant to variable Y in
conditions W if some ideal intervention on X in conditions W changes the
value of Y (or the probability distribution over possible values of Y)’5
(Craver [2007], p. 94, emphasis added).
Craver defines ideal interventions, which I will call ‘ideal etiological inter-
ventions’ to contrast them with their ‘interlevel’ variants below, as follows.
An ideal [etiological] intervention I on X with respect to Y is a change
in the value of X that changes Y, if at all, only via the change in X.
More specifically, this requirement implies that:
(I1) I does not change Y directly;
(I2) I does not change the value of some causal intermediate S between X and Y
except by changing the value of X;
(I3) I is not correlated with some other variable M that is a cause of Y;6 and
(I4) I acts as a ‘switch’ that controls the value of X irrespective of X’s other
causes, U. (Craver [2007], p. 96; original emphasis; adapted from
Woodward and Hitchcock [2003])
(Whereas Craver treats I as an intervention, Woodward ([2003]) and
Woodward and Hitchcock ([2003]) treat it as an intervention variable, some
values of which give rise to an intervention. As I am convinced that this dif-
ference will play no role in my arguments, I will pass it by in the rest of this
article. Another, much more important difference between Craver’s definition
and theirs will show up in Section 5.)
3 Craver is not the only one to incorporate Woodward’s manipulationism in his theory of mech-
anisms. For related views, see (Glennan [2002]; Woodward [2002]; Leuridan [2010]).
4 The variables in question are random variables (determinables such as ‘sex’) that can take either
finitely or infinitely many jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive values (determinates such as
‘male’ and ‘female’).
5 Whereas Craver here formulates invariance under interventions merely as a sufficient condition
for causation, Woodward treats it as a necessary and sufficient condition: ‘Invariance under at
least one testing intervention (on variables figuring in the generalization) is necessary and suf-
ficient for a generalization to represent a causal relationship or to figure in explanations’
(Woodward [2003], p. 250).
6 As it stands, (I3) is too restrictive. There is of course no reason to exclude I’s being correlated
(due to its being a cause of) with a causal intermediate M between I and X, provided M causes Y
only via X; see (Woodward [2003], p. 98).
Bert Leuridan402
A generalization is causal if (and only if ?; see footnote 5) it is invariant
under some range of interventions. This range of interventions need not be
universal. Invariance under interventions is a gradual notion (Woodward
[2003], pp. 257–65). As a result, invariant generalizations need not be universal
or exceptionless (Woodward [2003], pp. 270–2). For Craver, this makes
invariance the right concept to tackle causality and explanation in biology
and in neuroscience. In his view, causal generalizations in biology rarely if
ever satisfy the traditional criteria for lawfulness (necessity, universality, etc.):
they are limited in scope, stochastic, mechanistically fragile, and historically
contingent (Craver [2007], pp. 66–9). Yet they can function in explanation.
Woodward’s manipulationist account explains why and how they do.
Moreover, Woodward’s account also nicely fits (etiological) experimental
practice in neuroscience (Craver [2007], pp. 93–8).
4 Interlevel Constitutive Relations and Mutual Manipulability
Intralevel relations are causal in Craver’s view if they are invariant under some
range of ideal etiological interventions. But how should we conceive of the
relation between the levels?
Craver and Bechtel’s ([2007]) answer is negative: interlevel relations are
constitutive, not causal.7 They claim not only that ‘constitutive relation’
and ‘causal relation’ are distinct concepts, but also that no constitutive relation
can also be a causal relation. They have three arguments (see Craver [2007],
pp. 153–4; Craver and Bechtel [2007], pp. 552–4). These will play an important
role in this article.
. Symmetry argument: constitutive relations are symmetric8 whereas
many, if not most, causal relationships are unidirectional.
. Logical argument: ‘[. . .] in the constitutive relation, a token instance of
the property  is, in part, constituted by an instance of the property ;
as such, the tokening of  is not logically independent of the tokening of
 . At least since Hume, many philosophers have held that causes and
effects must be logically independent’ (Craver [2007], p. 153).
. Synchronicity argument: interlevel relations are synchronic whereas on
many accounts of causation causes must precede their effects.9
7 The main argument of their paper is that there is no interlevel causation. ‘We argue that intel-
ligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without re-
mainder, as appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are
hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel’
(Craver and Bechtel [2007], p. 547).
8 For a criticism of this claim, see (Kistler [2009], p. 601).
9 ‘Synchronicity’ is not used in the Jungian sense here.
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Craver ([2007]) offers a positive answer to the question how we should
conceive of the interlevel relations by providing an account of constitutive
relevance. His working account is as follows:10
[A] component is relevant to the behavior of a mechanism as a whole when
one can wiggle the behavior of the whole by wiggling the behavior of the
component and one can wiggle the behavior of the component by wiggling
the behavior as a whole. The two are related as part to whole and they are
mutually manipulable.11 (Craver [2007], p. 153, original emphasis)
This working account is explicated as follows:
More formally: (i) X is part of S; (ii) in the conditions relevant to the request
for explanation there is some change to X’s -ing that changes S’s  -ing;
and (iii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation there is
some change to S’s  -ing that changes X’s -ing. (Craver [2007], p. 153)
The conditions (ii) and (iii) are then further explicated in terms of
Woodward’s manipulability account (or a revised version thereof, since con-
stitutive relations are said to be non-causal) by means of the following four
principles, which together with the parthood condition constitute the mutual
manipulability account of constitutive relevance:
(CR1) When [in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation] 
is set to the value 1 in an ideal intervention, then  takes on the value
f(1). (Craver [2007], p. 155)
[Moreover] there should be an ideal intervention on X’s -ing that
changes the value of S’s  -ing under the conditions (CR1a) that the
intervention, I, leaves all of the other dependency relations in S’s  -ing
unchanged and (CR1b) that other interventions have removed the
contributions of other redundant components. (Craver [2007], pp. 156–7)
(CR2) [I]f [in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation]  is
set to the value  1 in an ideal intervention, then  takes on the value
f( 1). (Craver [2007], p. 159)
This notion of ideal intervention is not the one we encountered in Section 3.
In the context of constitutive relevance, ideal interventions are characterized
as follows (let me call them ‘ideal interlevel interventions’):
[A]n ideal [interlevel] intervention I on  with respect to  is a change
in the value of  that changes  , if at all, only via the change in .
This implies that:12
(I1c) the intervention I does not change  directly;
10 Craver ([2007], p. 141) explicitly intends this to be a sufficient condition for constitutive
relevance.
11 The predicate ‘component’ applies both to entities and activities (Craver [2007], p. 7). Note that
components should not be confused with mere parts.
12 Note the similarity with conditions (I1)–(I4). This similarity will play an important role in the
following section.
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(I2c) I does not change the value of some other variable * that changes
the value of  except via the change introduced into ;
(I3c) I is not correlated with some other variable M that is causally
independent of I and also a cause of  ; and
(I4c) I fixes the value of  in such a way as to screen off the contribution
of ’s other causes to the value of . (Craver [2007], p. 154, original
emphasis)
This account of interlevel relations raises two questions. The first question,
to be discussed in the following section, concerns the relation between consti-
tutive relevance and causal relevance. Doesn’t the former entail the latter?
The second question concerns the plausibility of (CR1a). This problem is
rather unrelated to my main argument; but I think it is interesting in its
own right, so let me tackle it here.
Craver supplements (CR1) with the principles (CR1a) and (CR1b) because
(CR1) does not provide a necessary condition for X’s -ing to be relevant to
S’s  -ing. ‘Satisfying CR1 is unnecessary because compensatory responses
(such as recovery, redundancy, and reorganization) can prevent changes to
S’s  -ing [. . .]’ (Craver [2007], p. 156). Recovery, redundancy, and reorgan-
ization are actual problems faced by experimental researchers in neuroscience
and in the life sciences in general. (CR1a) excludes cases of recovery and
reorganization. (CR1b) deals with cases of redundancy. Whereas the latter
amendment is fairly acceptable (see footnote 13), in a sense the former is not.
Recovery and reorganization (also known as robustness) are both common
and important phenomena: ‘The capacity for robustness appears to be both
ubiquitous and significant for biological systems. Indeed robustness gives
evolved complex systems, including organisms and ecosystems, the ability to
survive in an environment with changing internal and external conditions’
(Mitchell [2009], pp. 71–2). The question whether (CR1a) is plausible is thus
important.13
One may defend (CR1a) by stressing that it is fairly weak, due to the exist-
ential quantification over interventions. Craver merely demands that there is
an ideal interlevel intervention that does not elicit reorganization (let me
call this a neutral intervention), whereas robustness only entails that some
(or perhaps most) interventions are not neutral. The assumption that for
some robust system there is a neutral intervention is thus methodologically
13 That (CR1b) is fairly acceptable can be seen from Mitchell’s work on complexity. In the context
of etiological research on complex systems (she focuses on gene expression), the absence of
changes in Y given a single intervention on X is not considered a sufficient reason to conclude
that X is not a cause of Y. Complex systems are investigated by means of multivariate experi-
mental techniques and network analysis. ‘Exploring multiple scenarios rather than shielded
experiments on targeted single components may prove more conducive to understanding
context-rich causal structures’ (Mitchell [2009], p. 83). This use of multivariate techniques is
what (CR1b) comes down to.
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acceptable. Yet arguably it is metaphysically wrong.14 Even if most robust
systems are such that there is a neutral intervention, there is no reason
to assume this holds for all robust systems. Given that (CR1a) is meant to
take part in the definition of constitutive relevance, it is too strong.
5 Doesn’t Constitutive Relevance Entail Causal Relevance?
The above characterization of constitutive relevance arouses suspicion.
It looks as if constitutive relevance implies causal relevance, even though
Craver ([2007]) and Craver and Bechtel ([2007]) explicitly deny this. If X’s
-ing is constitutively relevant for S’s  -ing, then changing X’s -ing is a
good means to change or control S’s  -ing. But then, isn’t X’s -ing causally
relevant for S’s  -ing? Let us have a look in more detail.
Suppose that X’s -ing is constitutively relevant for S’s  -ing. Then there is
an ideal interlevel intervention I on  with respect to  such that the inter-
vention on  changes  , if at all, only via the change in . Since, by hypothesis,
I is an ideal interlevel intervention, conditions (I1c) to (I4c) are satisfied. As I
will now show, it follows that conditions (I1)–(I4) all are satisfied too. The
question then is whether this implies that I is an ideal etiological intervention
on  with respect to  .15 If I is an ideal etiological intervention on  with
respect to  , then X’s -ing is causally relevant to S’s  -ing.
First, (I1) is satisfied because (I1c) is—just substitute  and  (which are
variables the values of which denote activities) for X and Y (which arguably
play the same role in the definition of ideal etiological interventions), respect-
ively. Second, by (I2c) I does not change the value of any other variable *
that changes the value of  except via the change introduced into . Hence,
a fortiori it does not change the value of any causal intermediate, if any,
between  and  except by changing the value of ; so (I2) is satisfied too.
Third, condition (I3) seems the hardest part, but it is satisfied as well. By (I3c),
I is not correlated with any other variable M that is causally independent of
14 This case is similar to the status of faithfulness in causal discovery. Faithfulness is an assumption
relating to causal graphs and probability distributions that greatly simplifies algorithms for
causal discovery (Spirtes et al. [2000], pp. 13–4). A probability distribution P(V) and a directed
acyclic graph G¼hV, Ei satisfy the faithfulness condition if and only if every probabilistic
independence relation true in P is entailed by the Markov condition as applied to G, i.e. P
verifies no ‘extra’ independence relations. (The Markov condition applied to G states for each
node in V that, conditionally on its graphic parents, it is probabilistically independent of its
graphic non-descendants.) The faithfulness assumption is methodologically acceptable, yet
metaphysically wrong. It is methodologically acceptable since the probability of randomly
drawing an unfaithful distribution from the set of distributions that are causally Markov to
G, is zero; see (Meek [1995]) for a more rigorous statement in terms of Lebesgue measure. It is
metaphysically wrong because unfaithful distributions do exist.
15 In the following exposition I will not assume that  and  are not causally related, because that is
precisely what is at stake. Therefore, I will assume it makes sense to talk about the causal
intermediates between  and  .
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I and also a cause of  . In condition (I3), no restriction to causes of M that are
causally independent of I is made. So what about cases in which I is correlated
with some M such that I is a cause of M and M is a cause of  ? These are dealt
with by (I2c). Either I changes the value of M (which in turn changes the value
of  ) only via , or it does not. The first case is allowed for by (I2c) and should
not be considered a counterexample to (I3); the second case is excluded
by (I2c). Fourth, (I4) is satisfied because (I4c) is (by substitution).
If I satisfies (I1c)–(I4c), then it satisfies (I1)–(I4). The question now is
whether this shows that I is an ideal etiological intervention on  with respect
to  . If it were, X’s -ing would be causally relevant for S’s  -ing.
There is some room for interpretation here. Craver’s definition of ideal
etiological interventions (see Section 3) differs both from Woodward and
Hitchcock’s definition ([2003], pp. 12–3) and from Woodward’s definition
([2003], p. 98). Craver formulates his clauses (I1)–(I4) as implications (and
thus, it seems, as necessary conditions) of his general characterization of ideal
etiological interventions. Woodward and Hitchcock treat similar (but slightly
different) conditions as sufficient for some variable I’s being an intervention
variable. Woodward treats similar (but again slightly different) conditions as
both necessary and sufficient for some I’s being an intervention variable.
(Woodward ([2003]) and Woodward and Hitchcock ([2003]) do not explain
the difference between their definitions; Craver ([2007]) does not explain the
difference between his definition and those of Woodward ([2003]) or
Woodward and Hitchcock ([2003])). If we follow either Woodward’s or
Woodward and Hitchcock’s characterization, the above analysis counts as a
genuine proof of the thesis that X’s -ing being constitutively relevant for S’s
 -ing implies its being causally relevant for S’s -ing as well. If it can be shown
that (clauses similar to) (I1)–(I4) can be deduced from (I1c)–(I4c), it is proved
that I is an ideal etiological intervention.16
If we follow Craver’s definition, ‘X’s -ing is causally relevant for S’s  -ing’
does not follow deductively from ‘X’s -ing is constitutively relevant for S’s
 -ing’. But then the question is: which are the cases such that I satisfies
(I1)–(I4), whereas X’s -ing is not causally relevant for S’s  -ing? To safe-
guard his thesis that no constitutive relations are at the same time also causal
relations, Craver needs to show that for all cases in which I satisfies (I1)–(I4)
and also (I1c)–(I4c), I is not a genuine ideal etiological intervention. Of course,
the reason he adduces may not be ad hoc.
Craver’s current position (personal communication) is that criteria such as
(I1)–(I4) are neither necessary nor sufficient for I’s being an ideal etiological
intervention. They are not sufficient because they do not include a modularity
16 In the appendix, I show that Woodward’s clauses (I1w)–(I4w), which he considers to be necessary
and sufficient for I’s being an ideal etiological intervention, can be derived from Craver’s def-
inition of ideal interlevel interventions.
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requirement. He now tends to treat them as potent, yet fallible, indicators of
causal relevance relations obtaining among a system of variables. They are
fallible because, e.g. modularity may fail (for some system) (end of personal
communication).
Before I assess this argument, let me briefly discuss modularity. Strictly
speaking, modularity is a feature of systems of structural equations (or
more generally of causal models):
It says that each structural equation in a system of structural equations
that correctly captures the causal relations among a set of variables is
invariant under interventions that disrupt other equations in the system
by setting the values of their dependent variables within some limited
range17 (Hausman and Woodward [1999], pp. 542–3).
Derivatively, modularity is a feature of that part of reality that is correctly
described by the modular system of equations (or the causal model): ‘[. . .] it is
nature and in particular facts about what happens or would happen under
interventions that determine whether a given system of equations is modular’
(Hausman and Woodward [1999], p. 544). As such, it states that distinct
causal relations are independently disruptable: ‘The central presupposition
underlying this discussion of modularity [. . .] is that if two mechanisms18
are genuinely distinct it ought to be possible (in principle) to interfere with
one without changing the other’ (Hausman and Woodward [1999], p. 549).
I acknowledge that modularity may fail, especially in such ‘messy’ causal
systems as studied by neuroscience or by the biological and the social sciences
in general (cf. my discussion of (CR1a) and robustness at the end of the pre-
vious section). Yet there are three problems with using failure of modularity
to block the inference from constitutive to causal relevance.19 First, failure
of modularity has little to do with Craver and Bechtel’s reasons to deny
interlevel relations a causal interpretation. Second, it is doubtful that all
cases in which I satisfies both (I1)–(I4) and (I1c)–(I4c) are cases in which modu-
larity fails. Hence, even if failure of modularity would be a good reason to
adduce in some of the cases, it should be backed by other reasons to cover the
remaining cases. Third, this solution is inconsistent with the mutual manipu-
lability account of constitutive relevance. Modularity, like invariance, is a
gradual notion: ‘[. . .] when one intervenes and sets the value of X (thereby
disrupting the equation (mechanism) that determined the value of X), the
17 This definition of modularity has been heavily disputed: see (Cartwright [2002], p. 417;
Hausman and Woodward [2004], p. 149; Steel [2006], p. 228) for alternative definitions.
18 ‘Mechanisms’ is not used here in the sense of Section 2, but as the ensemble of an effect and its
causes; so the definition is wholly etiological.
19 The personal communication mentioned above only addressed the question whether (I1)–(I4)
are necessary and/or sufficient for I’s being an ideal etiological intervention, not whether the
answer to this question could be used to block the inference from constitutive to causal
relevance.
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other equations will remain invariant only for some range of values of X’
(Hausman and Woodward [1999], p. 545, emphasis added). So strictly
speaking failure of modularity only occurs if the other equations/mechanisms
change for all values of X. But this is ruled out by (CR1a).
As it stands, either constitutive relevance implies causal relevance (if
(I1)–(I4) are treated as sufficient conditions) or we need a set of principled
reasons why ideal interlevel interventions, all of which satisfy (I1)–(I4), cannot
be ideal etiological interventions. Let me call this Problem #1.
Can this problem be solved without abandoning the strict distinction be-
tween constitutive and causal relevance? In my opinion, the best way would be
to focus on the parthood condition in the mutual manipulability account of
constitutive relevance, because seemingly that would require no changes to
Craver’s views. Craver and Bechtel’s logical argument is that causes and their
effects must be distinct events, objects, or processes. Since mechanisms and
their components are related as wholes and parts, they are not genuinely dis-
tinct. Invoking parthood would not be ad hoc and it would cover all cases of
constitutive relevance at once. The argument can be turned into a straightfor-
ward solution to Problem #1. Consider the following assumption:
Assumption 1: if X is part of S, then an intervention I on X directly changes S.
If we accept Assumption 1, then we must conclude that condition (I1) is
violated, that the intervention in question is not an ideal etiological interven-
tion, and that X and S are not causally related. Unfortunately, this solution
has two important drawbacks. First, if we accept Assumption 1, it is hard to
deny the following:
Assumption 2: if X is part of S, then an intervention I on X’s -ing directly
changes S’s  -ing.
If we accept Assumption 2, then we must conclude that condition (I1c)
is violated too, that the intervention in question is not an ideal interlevel
intervention either, and that X and S are also not constitutively related.
Thus the above solution would only work if Craver revised his concept of
ideal interlevel intervention.
The second drawback is that it requires that we have a good account of the
parthood relation. As I will show in the following section, it is hard to find an
account of parthood that does not cause further problems for the mutual
manipulability account of constitutive relevance.
6 Parthood and Endosymbiosis
In the previous sections we saw that constitutive relevance is defined partly in
terms of parthood and that this may sow the seeds of a solution to Problem
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#1. But when is X part of S? It will emerge that there is no straightforward
answer to this question in the present context.
Formal mereology is not of any help here. It mostly treats (proper) part-
hood as a primitive relation having certain formal properties (in standard
mereology, proper parthood is transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive), but it
gives no criterion for parthood itself. ‘The relation of proper part, <, does not
require much illustration, since it is firmly embedded in our ordinary way
of conceptualizing the world; it holds, for example, between a man and his
forearm’ (Koslicki [2008], p. 11).
In my view, the most natural definition is in terms of spatio-temporal
inclusion:
(STI) X is part of S iff the spatio-temporal region occupied by X is
contained in the spatio-temporal region occupied by S.20
Although STI is intuitively appealing, it leads to problems in the context of
the mutual manipulability account.21 Consider the following definitions:
Symbioses are long-term associations between different species typically
with a substantially smaller symbiont living in or on a considerably
larger multicellular host. Microbes are often endosymbionts living inside
of host bodies. [. . .] Intracellular symbionts (e.g. bacteria) are typically
found in the cytoplasm of host cells. [. . .] In a mutualistic symbiosis,
both symbiont and host benefit. In an obligate mutualism, both symbiont
and host require the presence of the other. (Lombardo [2008], p. 480,
original italics)
A well-known example of obligate mutualistic endosymbiosis is provided
by Buchnera bacteria and aphids. Aphids, like many other insect hosts, have
bacteriocytes (also known as ‘mycetocytes’). These are specialized cells that
host bacterial symbionts (Ishikawa [2003], p. 6). One of the most important
symbionts they host is Buchnera. Buchnera and aphids are mutually dependent
for their nutrition (for the experimental evidence underlying these claims,
see Section 9).
One of the most characteristic features of Buchnera, unveiled by our
genome analysis, is that the genes for biosyntheses [sic] of the amino
acids essential for the aphid hosts [. . .] are present, but those for the
non-essential amino acids are almost completely missing [. . .]. This
complementarity of the gene repertoire shows how successfully the
20 STI is restricted to parts and wholes that have a spatio-temporal location. Thus, ‘Rationality is
part of personhood’ may be true, even though rationality and personhood do not satisfy STI.
(See Varzi [2009] for examples of parts and wholes that have no spatio-temporal location.) STI is
similar in spirit to Goodman’s account of parthood in terms of ‘overlap’ ([1977], p. 35) and it
equally treats of parthood as a reflexive relation.
21 Craver ([2007], pp. 141–2, 187–8) rejects spatial containment as a criterion for componency, yet I
am focussing on the broader category of parthood; ‘Not all parts are components’ (Craver
[2007], p. 140).
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symbiosis is operating, in that Buchnera provides the host with what the
host cannot synthesize, and conversely, the host provides the symbiont
with what Buchnera cannot synthesize. Moreover, as the precursors
of some essential amino acids are non-essential amino acids, glutamate
and aspartate [. . .], the biosynthetic pathways of both the host and the
symbiont are not only complementary, but also mutually dependent.
This analysis is consistent with experimental evidence that aphids do not
usually excrete a nitrogenous waste product, but recycle the amino
groups as glutamine, which Buchnera uses as a substrate for the synthesis
of essential amino acids [. . .]. (Shigenobu et al. [2000], p. 82)
An amino acid is essential for an organism (in casu the aphids) if the or-
ganism cannot synthesize it in sufficient quantities; it must therefore be present
in the diet (Martin and Hine [2008]). But the aphids’ natural diet, phloem sap,
is too poor to provide the essential amino acids in large enough amounts
(Douglas [1993]). The essential amino acids in question are synthesized by
Buchnera. The Buchnera in turn need amino acids such as glutamine, aspar-
tate, and glutamate that are non-essential for the aphids, but which they
cannot synthesize themselves and hence must receive from their hosts.
If we accept both the mutual manipulability account of constitutive rele-
vance and STI as a definition of parthood, the Buchnera should be considered
components of their hosts, since the following hold:
(i) Buchnera are spatio-temporally contained in the aphids’ bacteriocytes,
and thus are part of their hosts;
(ii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation (viz. when
aphids feed on phloem sap), there is some change to the Buchnera’s
’-ing that changes the aphid’s  -ing; and
(iii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation, there is some
change to the aphid’s  -ing that changes the Buchnera’s ’-ing.
In view of Glennan’s law that every mechanism is of or for something (see
Section 2), we must delineate the explanandum activity ( ) fairly precisely.
Likewise, we must clearly delineate the purported component’s relevant ac-
tivity (’). As is evident from Shigenobu et al. ([2000], p. 82; see also their
figures 2 and 3),  is the synthesizing of amino acids that are non-essential
for the aphids; ’ is the synthesizing of amino acids that are essential for the
aphids.22
22 Of course, there is more than one essential amino acid that plays a role in this symbiotic rela-
tionship, just like there is more than one non-essential amino acid. So strictly speaking, we
should distinguish different explanandum activities ( 1-ing,  2-ing, . . .) and different compo-
nent activities (’1-ing, ’2-ing, . . .). Which  i’s are related to (or needed for) which ’j’s, and vice
versa, is represented by biosynthetic pathways. So the Buchnera and the aphids bear seemingly
constitutive relationships in multiple ways. But that does not conflict with Glennan’s law (each
of the ’i and  j are well delineated) and by itself is no reason to say these relations cannot be
constitutive.
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Even though the aphid–Buchnera relationship nicely fits Craver’s working
account, there are good reasons why Buchnera should not be considered
components. First and foremost, the relation between the aphid’s and the
Buchnera’s respective activities is diachronic. The production of each token
amino acid by the Buchnera, precedes the use of that token amino acid in the
aphid’s synthesizing (a token instance of) another type of amino acid, and vice
versa. Constitutive relations, in contrast, are said to be synchronic (see Section
4 for Craver and Bechtel’s criterion, and Section 11 for a methodological
guideline based on this criterion). Second, hosts and their symbionts are by
definition members of distinct species (cf. the definitions at the beginning of this
section) and thus must themselves also be distinct (whereas mechanisms and
their components are not distinct). Third, whereas endosymbionts are located
in their hosts, ectosymbionts are not. Therefore, they should not be considered
STI-parts (and a fortiori components) of their hosts. But this differential treat-
ment of endosymbionts and ectosymbionts would be rather arbitrary.
(This is not to say that Buchnera and aphids—or hosts and their endo- or
ectosymbionts in general—cannot figure as components in the same (eco-
logical) mechanism. But still the relation between the symbionts is causal,
not constitutive.23 This is also not to say that Buchnera or aphids cannot
themselves be treated as ‘wholes’ for mechanistic decomposition, only that
in a decomposition of the aphids, the Buchnera cannot serve as components.)
The case of Buchnera and aphids is not a rarity. Plenty of similar counter-
examples can be found. Mutualistic endosymbiosis is widespread and has
played an important role in the evolution of many species:
Today, the world abounds with mutualistic symbioses between microbes
and multicellular hosts, and hundreds of examples can be found [. . .]. It is
probable that all multicellular organisms will be found to exist in obligate
mutualistic symbiotic relationships with microbes that aid them in
nutrition and defense against predators or pathogens [. . .] (Lombardo
[2008], p. 482).
In short, if STI were accepted as an account of parthood, plenty of cases of
bidirectional causation would unintentionally fit the mutual manipulability
account of constitutive relevance. Thus the mutual manipulability account
would not provide a sufficient condition for constitutive relevance (contra
Craver’s claim it does provide a sufficient condition; [2007], p. 141). Let me
call this Problem #2.
A corollary of Problem #2 is that one cannot solve Problem #1 by sim-
ply restricting the scope of application of the manipulationist account of caus-
ation (as a semantic or interpretive project, cf. (Woodward [2003], p. 95)
23 For an account of ecological mechanisms which integrates Woodward’s account of causation,
see (Pâslaru [2009]).
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so that it cannot be applied to things which are related as parts and wholes.
For that would presuppose one has a clear account of ‘parthood’.24
7 Possible Ways Out
How could one solve Problem #1 without abandoning the strict distinction
between constitutive and causal relevance and without inviting Problem #2?
One solution would be to adopt another definition of parthood. However, I do
not see which definition would do—I consider STI the most natural definition.
Therefore, I will not try to provide an alternative definition of parthood here,
but merely sketch three obvious constraints for any such alternative. First, on
pain of circularity the definition should not rely on the notion of constitutive
relevance. Second, the definition should be such that parthood does not co-
incide with componency. Otherwise, clause (i) of the working account would
be superfluous and the distinction between mere parts and relevant parts
would vanish. These were part of the reasons why I opted for STI: spatio-
temporal containment does not coincide with componency, and it is devoid of
any appeal to constitutive relevance. Third, one may not just drop the require-
ment that X be part of S from the mutual manipulability account. Otherwise,
all cases of circular or bidirectional causation (such as causal feedback mech-
anisms, cf. Section 9) would count as cases of constitutive relevance.
Another solution would be to add another requirement to the mutual ma-
nipulability account, to wit synchronicity. Not only should X be part of S and
should X’s -ing and S’s  -ing be mutually manipulable. For X’s -ing to
be constitutively relevant for S’s  -ing, the two should also be synchronic. In
my view, to spell this out would be a very promising move to make on Craver’s
behalf. However, let me point to three further considerations. First, it only
makes sense to say that instances of X’s -ing are synchronic with instances of
S’s -ing. If X’s -ing and S’s -ing are treated as type-level variables, they are
neither synchronic nor diachronic. Second, there is no guarantee that adding
this further condition would make the mutual manipulability account immune
to exceptions. If causation is defined along interventionist lines, then there
exist cases of synchronic causation (see Section 11). So it is at least conceivable
that there are cases of synchronic mutual manipulability that satisfy the part-
hood condition (as defined by STI). Of course, unless one finds a convincing
example, Craver need not worry too much about this mere possibility. Third,
in the rest of this article, I will discuss more practical problems relating to
mechanisms and constitutive relevance. Even though it is relatively clear what
it means to say that token instances of two variables are synchronic or
24 This does not preclude using knowledge of part–whole relations to solve methodological prob-
lems in practice (see Section 10).
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diachronic, it may not be so easy to distinguish between synchronic and dia-
chronic relations in practice (see Section 11).
8 Interlevel Experiments
Up until now, I have been focusing on conceptual (or if you wish, metaphys-
ical) issues. What are intralevel causation and interlevel constitutive rele-
vance? Are the two really distinct? What is parthood? . . . From now on,
I will focus on epistemological or methodological questions, such as how we
can find out that X’s -ing is constitutively relevant for S’s  -ing.
Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance is derived
from actual ‘interlevel’ experimental practice in neuroscience and the biomed-
ical sciences in general. Interlevel experiments are like experiments for testing
etiological causal claims, but there is one important difference. In the latter,
the intervention and detection techniques are applied to the same mechanistic
level. In the former, they are applied to different levels of mechanisms (Craver
[2007], p. 145).
There are different kinds of interlevel experiments (Craver [2007],
pp. 146–52; Craver and Bechtel [2007], pp. 553–4). Interlevel experiments
can either be bottom-up or top-down. In the first case, the intervention tech-
niques are applied to the level of the mechanism’s purported components and
the detection techniques are applied to the level of the explanandum phenom-
enon. In the latter case, this is the reverse. Interlevel experiments can also be
either inhibitory (when the entities and activities intervened on are inhibited,
diminished, disabled, destroyed, etc.) or excitatory (when they are stimulated,
excited, enhanced, etc.).
These distinctions jointly give rise to four kinds of experiments. Interference
experiments are bottom-up and inhibitory. Stimulation experiments are
bottom-up and excitatory. Activation experiments are top-down and excita-
tory.25 The last kind, viz. top-down inhibitory deprivation experiments,
is quite rare in neuroscience. Each of these kinds faces certain inferential
challenges which can partly be remedied by performing them in tandem,
i.e. by combining bottom-up and top-down experiments. This is part of the
motivation for Craver’s mutual manipulability account ([2007], p. 158).
In my view, Craver’s endeavor to tie his account of constitutive relevance to
actual interlevel experimental practice is highly commendable. By analyzing
what interlevel experiments are, what inferential challenges they face, and how
these challenges can be remedied, his account of mechanisms may not only be
interesting for the philosopher of science, but also for the practising scientist.
In the remaining sections, I would like to add to this undertaking by pointing
25 In (Craver [2002]), these were called additive experiments.
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to an inferential challenge that Craver hitherto has not addressed and by
suggesting some partial (and fallible) remedies.
9 The Problem of Underdetermination
In Section 6, we have seen that cases of mutualistic endosymbiosis generate a
problem (Problem #2) for the mutual manipulability account of constitutive
relevance. If parthood is defined along the lines of STI, the mutual manipu-
lability account does not provide a sufficient condition for constitutive rele-
vance. Problem #2 has a methodological counterpart. Consider the following
quote:
Aphid requirement for the symbiosis [with Buchnera] has been demons-
trated by studies of bacteria-free aphids, usually called aposymbiotic
aphids. These aphids can be generated experimentally by antibiotic
treatment, usually chlortetracycline or rifampicin administered either
orally or by injection into the hemolymph [. . .]. At the appropriate
dosage, these antibiotics have minimal direct deleterious effect on insect
metabolism or behavior [. . .]. (Douglas [1998], p. 21)
Experiments with aposymbiotic aphids have been crucial in the study of
the aphid–Buchnera symbiosis. However, they strongly resemble interference
experiments. First, they are obviously inhibitory (the bacteria are removed in
order to inhibit their -ing). Second, since the bacteria are STI-parts of the
aphids, one could be tempted to regard the experiment as bottom-up rather
than etiological. Third, the researchers make sure that the aphids’  -ing is
not directly changed, cf. condition (I1c) above. Fourth, in line with the
idea that mechanisms are always mechanisms of or for a given phenomenon
(see Glennan’s law in Section 2), the experiments are aimed at specific explan-
andum activities or functions  (and component activities ’). Buchnera con-
tribute to the aphids’ essential amino acid requirements, but, most probably,
not to their lipid, sterol, or vitamin requirements (Douglas [1998], pp. 27–9).
Conversely, the aphids contribute to specific needs of the Buchnera, by produ-
cing non-essential amino acids, some of which the Buchnera need as precursors
to produce essential amino acids (Shigenobu et al. [2000], p. 82).26
Experiments on aphids and Buchnera resembling top-down interlevel
experiments are less common, due to several methodological obstacles. Still,
some can be compared with deprivation experiments:
Preparations of isolated Buchnera can be obtained by techniques akin to
the protocols for the isolation of organelles, such as mitochondria [. . .].
The isolated Buchnera preparations are viable and metabolically active
for several hours, and they can be used to establish basic metabolic
26 See Section 6, where I discussed the precise delineation of  and ’.
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capabilities, such as capacity for aerobic respiration and DNA and
protein synthesis [. . .]. These Buchnera preparations are not, however,
metabolically equivalent to Buchnera in symbiosis, as is illustrated by the
dramatic effect of isolation on the array of proteins synthesized by the
bacteria [. . .]. (Douglas [1998], p. 22)
Isolation of Buchnera comes down to depriving them from the aphid’s
 -ing. The result is a change (a dramatic effect) in their -ing.
Experiments aimed at the study of metabolic versatility of Buchnera in turn
resemble activation and/or deprivation experiments. The metabolic versatility
of Buchnera is the extent to which the nutrients they provide to their aphid
host may vary, in accordance with the aphid’s demand for those nutrients
(Douglas [1998], p. 30). Consider the following experiment:
When a single clone of A. pisum [Pea aphid] was reared on chemically
defined diets of different amino acid composition, the free amino acid
titers of symbiotic aphids were very uniform, whereas those of
aposymbiotic aphids bore distinct similarities to the amino acid
composition of the diets on which they were feeding [. . .]. These data
were interpreted as evidence for a breakdown in regulation of the free
amino acid pools in aposymbiotic aphids. The implication is that the
bacteria contribute directly to amino acid homeostasis in symbiotic
aphids, i.e. control over the profile of amino acids provided by the
bacteria is so fine-tuned that it maintains the optimal amino acid titers of
the aphid body fluids. (Douglas [1998], p. 31)
In what sense does this experiment resemble activation or deprivation
experiments? The manipulation of the aphid’s diet resembles top-down inter-
ventions. Depending on the chemical composition of the diets in the respective
experimental groups, this manipulation is either inhibitory or excitatory.
The difference between the free amino acid titers of symbiotic and aposym-
biotic aphids provides evidence for Buchnera’s adaptive -ing in symbiotic
aphids and hence may count as a detection technique at the bottom-level.
In short, research into aphid–Buchnera endosymbiosis is to a large extent
based on experiments that closely resemble interlevel experiments. They are
inhibitory or excitatory, they appear ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ and they are
performed in tandem with other, ‘reverse’ experiments (i.e. experiments that
appear ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’).
This situation is not confined to the study of endosymbiosis. Plenty of
etiological relations are symmetrical or bidirectional. Examples of causal feed-
back are legion in the biological and the social sciences and they are certainly
not rare in neuroscience.27 Even more importantly, causal feedback is
27 Bibliographic search in the ISI Web of Knowledge for ‘topic¼(causal feedback)’ on 25 August
2009 yielded 1302 hits, 214 of which are in psychology, 210 in the behavioral sciences, 94 in the
neurosciences and neurology, 55 in biochemistry and molecular biology—these are the scientific
fields that Craver intends to address. One year later (on 24 September 2010) these numbers have
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considered one of the motors generating biological complexity and higher
level phenomena—the very phenomena Craver wants to explain (Mitchell
[2003], pp. 38–57, [2009], pp. 34–44).28 With these bidirectional causal rela-
tions go experiments that treat a variable one time as a cause variable, another
time as an effect variable.29
The question, or the methodological problem, now is: how do we know
these experiments are not top-down or bottom-up, but merely etiological?
Let me call this the ‘problem of underdetermination’ or, simply, Problem
#3. The issue seems insoluble when we allow ourselves to use only the re-
sources of the mutual manipulability account. Therefore, I will discuss some
additional resources in the next two sections. Craver underestimates this
problem:
In sum, I conjecture that to establish that X’s -ing is [constitutively]
relevant to S’s  -ing it is sufficient that one be able to manipulate S’s
 -ing by intervening to change X’s -ing (by stimulating or inhibiting)
and that one be able to manipulate X’s -ing by manipulating S’s  -ing.
(Craver [2007], p. 159, emphasis added)
Craver does address a distinct problem of underdetermination and he
proposes some possible solutions. The problem he addresses is that the dis-
tinction between a component and a background condition is likely to be
vague (Craver [2007], p. 143). For example, activation experiments may
suffer from an inferential challenge he calls mere correlates or sterile effects.
‘[. . .] intervening to make S  might activate some component X of S, but the
activation of that component has sterile effects, relative to S, on some irrele-
vant part, C. C would then be strongly correlated with task activation, but it
would not be part of the mechanism’ (Craver [2007], p. 152). C should then be
treated as a ‘poorly understood background condition’. Likewise, interference
experiments may suffer from an inferential challenge he calls indirect interfer-
ence: interference with X’s -ing may disrupt S’s  -ing even if the former is
even dramatically increased, especially in Craver’s fields of interest: 1456 hits in total (+11%),
254 in psychology (+19%), 247 in the behavioral sciences (+18%), 114 in the neurosciences and
neurology (+21%), 73 in biochemistry and molecular biology (+33%). (I must admit I do not
know what proportion of this increase is due to the inclusion of new journals in the ISI Web of
Knowledge.) It is also interesting to note that Craver’s own schematic representation of mech-
anisms includes a causal cycle at the lower level (Craver [2007], p. 7).
28 Craver admits that symmetric causal relations exist, but he seems to underrate both their inci-
dence and their importance: ‘Although there are some cases of cause and effect variables in
which the manipulability relationships are bidirectional (as in cases of feedback), many, if not
most, causal relationships are unidirectional’ (Craver [2007], p. 153, original emphasis).
29 In the literature on causal modeling, causal systems are commonly assumed to be acyclic. This
assumption drastically simplifies causal discovery and causal inference (see Pearl [2000]; Spirtes
et al. [2000]; see also Leuridan [2009] for a logic of causal discovery that relies on this assump-
tion). Although it is closely connected to this literature, Woodward’s framework does not pre-
sume such acyclicity (see Woodward [2003], p. 396).
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irrelevant to the latter, because it involves changes to some relevant compo-
nent A (Craver [2007], pp. 148–9). Again, X is not a component but only
a background condition. Thus, experiments that are prima facie top-down
(as the first example) or bottom-up (as in the second example) may fail to
establish constitutive relevance because they only involve changes in back-
ground conditions. This is the kind of underdetermination Craver addresses.
Can this problem be solved? Craver presents four ways in which, in neuros-
cientific practice, components are distinguished from mere background
conditions:
First, sometimes mere background conditions are identified by conjoin-
ing interference and stimulation strategies. Intervening to inhibit a
background condition B’s -ing may inhibit S’s  -ing, but one cannot
stimulate S’s  -ing by stimulating B’s -ing. [. . .] Second, sometimes
background conditions can be ruled out on the basis of activation
experiments. Although one can interfere with S’s  -ing by interfering
with background condition B’s -ing, at least in many cases, one cannot
alter B’s -ing by manipulating S’s  -ing. [. . .] Third, the effects of
interfering with background conditions tend to be nonspecific, that is,
they affect many phenomena besides the one under study. [. . .] Finally,
the effects of interventions that change background conditions on the
behaviors of mechanisms are often unsubtle. (Craver [2007], pp. 157–8)
More generally, Craver argues that bottom-up and top-down experiments
are (and should) be conducted in tandem. The inferential challenges faced
by one kind of experiment are often resolved by another. We saw that this
is part of the reason why he associates constitutive relevance with mutual
manipulability.
I do not doubt the merits of these strategies to solve Craver’s problem
of distinguishing between components and mere background conditions.
The reason I briefly present them is that they will not in general help to
solve Problem #3. Bidirectional causation can be studied by conjoining
(what seem to be) interference and stimulation strategies. It is not ruled out
by (what seem to be) activation experiments. And it does not tend to be
nonspecific or nonsubtle (at least it is no less specific and/or subtle than con-
stitutive relevance relations). In the following two sections, I will present two
guidelines which, when used in tandem, are fairly good yet fallible means to
solve Problem #3.
10 Solving the Problem of Underdetermination: Parthood
An experiment is interlevel if and only if intervention and detection are applied
at different levels. X’s -ing and S’s  -ing are at different levels if and only if
one is a component in a mechanism for the other (recall that levels are relative
to particular mechanisms). This is the case if and only if one is constitutively
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relevant for the other. But then the distinction between etiological and inter-
level experiments hinges on the notion of constitutive relevance. What ways
are there to solve Problem #3 without assuming we already know all constitu-
tive relevance relations?
In my opinion, good evidence of part–whole relations is indispensable
(yet not a wonder drug) here, as it provides a partial solution to Problem
#3. If it is clear that X is not part of S, then X’s -ing cannot be a component
in a mechanism for S’s  -ing. Hence, the bidirectional manipulability rela-
tions between the two (if any) must be causal. When is X not part of S? The
following variant of STI can help to explicate this:
(STI—) If there is good evidence that the spatio-temporal region occu-
pied by X is not contained in the spatio-temporal region occu-
pied by S, then that is good evidence that X is not part of S.30
This solution is only partial. First, it does not help to rule out constitutive
relevance in the case of endosymbiosis where our evidence tells us that the
Buchnera are contained in the aphids. Second, in many cases of bidirectional
causation one does not have good evidence that the one causal relatum is not
contained in the other. Causation in biology is a messy affair. Thus we should
seek for a complementary solution to Problem #3. In the following section,
I will discuss one such solution and present two further methodological prob-
lems it faces.
11 Synchronicity, the Etiological Nature of Experimental
Apparatus, and Causal-Constitutive Propagation
According to Craver and Bechtel, interlevel relations are synchronic whereas
on many accounts of causation causes must precede their effects. Thus prima
facie the following principle could be used as a complementary solution to
Problem #3.
(SYNCHR) Suppose that an experimental intervention31 on X’s -ing results
in a change in S’s  -ing. If the change in S’s  -ing occurs syn-
chronically with the intervention, then the relation between X’s
-ing and S’s  -ing is constitutive. If the change in S’s  -ing
occurs later in time, the relation is etiological.
In my opinion, SYNCHR is a fairly good principle for solving the problem
of underdetermination, but it faces two problems. A first, minor problem
is that—although rare—there may exist counterexamples to the underlying
30 Just like STI, STI— is only meant as a criterion for parts and wholes that have a spatio-temporal
location. Contrary to STI, it is a methodological principle.
31 SYNCHR is about real experimental interventions, not ideal interventions.
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idea: cases of synchronic invariant relations. Woodward does not explicitly
address the issue,32 but his example of a simple pendulum involves synchronic
causal relations. The length l of a simple pendulum is rightly regarded as
a cause of that pendulum’s period T. By intervening to change l, one changes
T (Woodward [2003], p. 197). Yet the change of period does not follow the
change of length in time.
The second problem is methodologically more threatening. It is often dif-
ficult to distinguish between synchronic and diachronic effects of interventions
in practice. More specifically, the effects of interlevel interventions may look
diachronic even if they are in fact synchronic. In the rest of this section I will
discuss two reasons why this may be the case.
The first reason has to do with the etiological nature of the apparatus (both
the intervention apparatus and the detection apparatus) in interlevel experi-
ments. In these experiments, an intervention technique is applied to one level
of the mechanism; then it is verified by means of some detection technique
(measurement apparatus, visualization technique) whether a change occurs at
the other level of the mechanism. Both intervention and detection involve
causal processes, and thus a time lag.33 There is a causal process and a time
lag between the change in the interlevel intervention variable I and the result-
ing change in X’s -ing (resp. S’s  -ing). And there is a causal process and a
time lag between the change in S’s  -ing (resp. X’s -ing) and the detection of
that change. As a result, even if the relation between the change in X’s -ing
(resp. S’s  -ing) and the change in S’s  -ing (resp. X’s -ing) is synchronic, the
relation between intervention and detection is diachronic. Conversely (and
here is the problem of underdetermination again): if the relation between
intervention and detection is diachronic, the relation between X’s -ing
(resp. S’s  -ing) and S’s  -ing (resp. X’s -ing) may either be diachronic
(and hence etiological) or synchronic (and hence most plausibly constitutive).
The second reason is what I would call causal-constitutive propagation.34
As an example, suppose that the mechanism for S’s  -ing consists of the
organized action of X1’s 1-ing, X2’s 2-ing, and X3’s 3-ing, that all and
only the following qualitative causal relations hold at the lower level: X11
! X22 ! X33, and that the actual values of the respective variables are:
1¼1*, 2¼2* and 3¼3*. Let us consider now the macro-level effect of
32 Woodward does not address the issue in Making Things Happen, ([2003]) and none of the
definitions comprising his account refers to temporal priority as a condition for causation. I
am not aware of any other source in which he does address the issue.
33 They would not involve a time lag if they were themselves cases of synchronic causation, but I
take it that most if not all intervention/detection techniques are diachronic.
34 Causal-constitutive propagation resembles Kistler’s ‘delayed’ interlevel causation ([2009],
pp. 598, 604). But whereas I raise causal-constitutive propagation in a methodological discus-
sion, he raises delayed interlevel causation as a conceptual possibility, based on the notion of
‘partial constraint’.
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an interlevel intervention I on X1’s 1-ing at three consecutive points in time.
First, X1’s 1-ing is intervened upon so that at time t its value is set to 1¼1
0
(with 1
0 6¼1*). As a result, S’s  -ing synchronically (i.e. at time t) obtains
some value  ¼ 0 (by CR1). But the change in X1’s 1-ing also has a
diachronic etiological effect on X2’s 2-ing so that at time t
0 (with t< t 0)
2¼ g(1
0), where g represents the causal relation between 1 and 2, and
g(1
0) 6¼2*. As a result, S’s  -ing synchronically (i.e. at time t
0) obtains
some value  ¼ 00 (which may differ from  0). Analogously, the change in
X2’s 2-ing etiologically affects X3’s 3-ing so that at time t
00 (with t 0< t 00)
3¼ g
0(g(1
0)) 6¼3* and  ¼ 
0 00 (which again may differ both from  0 and
 00). In general, a change in X1’s 1-ing at time t may result in changes in S’s
 -ing at later times t 0, t 00, . . . even if the relation between X1’s 1-ing and S’s
 -ing is constitutive.
For these two reasons, even if constitutive relations are synchronic, they
may look like diachronic relations in practice. Conversely, relations that seem
diachronic in practice may either be genuinely diachronic (and hence etiologic-
al) or synchronic (and hence most plausibly constitutive).
The first problem (cases of synchronic causation) and the second problem
(the diachronic appearance of constitutive relations) prompt us to revise
SYNCHR:
SYNCHR* Suppose that an experimental intervention on X’s -ing results
in a change in S’s  -ing. If the resulting change seems to occur
synchronically with the intervention, then we have reasons to
believe that the relation between X’s -ing and S’s  -ing is con-
stitutive. If the resulting change seems to occur later in time,
then we have reasons to believe that the relation is etiological.
The phrases ‘seem to’ and ‘reasons to believe’ capture the methodological
pitfalls outlined in this section, without providing grounds for a full-blown
skepticism regarding etiological and/or interlevel experiments. I think that
SYNCHR* and STI—, when used in tandem, are fairly good yet fallible guide-
lines to solve Problem #3. (Note that, in Section 6, my main reason for denying
that the Buchnera are components in the aphids, was an instance of SYNCHR*.)
12 Pragmatic Interests and the Boundaries of Mechanisms
In his ‘Mechanisms and Natural Kinds’ ([2009]), Craver explicitly argues that
there is no objective way to define the boundaries of mechanisms, at least not
in a strong sense of ‘objective’ (see also Craver [2007], pp. 141–4).35 Pragmatic
35 Craver’s main goal in his ‘Mechanisms and Natural Kinds’ is to argue against the hopes of the
homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view to provide an account of natural kinds that is free of
any conventional elements.
Problems for Mutual Manipulability 421
concerns, human interests, and perspective co-determine the boundaries
of mechanisms because they help determine what is relevant and what is
not. Could these pragmatic considerations help Craver to solve the problem
of underdetermination? Aren’t cases of underdetermination just cases where
relevance should play a more prominent role?36 I completely endorse the view
that pragmatic concerns and perspective play an important role in our mech-
anistic thinking, but my answer to the above question will be negative. Let me
consider two issues to motivate this answer.
A first issue is: relevance to what? Craver is very explicit on this point.
‘The answer is: relevance to the phenomena that we seek to predict, explain,
and control’ (Craver [2009], p. 590). In other words, much depends on our
choice of explanandum phenomenon and on the way we choose to describe it
(Craver [2009], p. 591). This is just a restatement of Glennan’s law: every
mechanism is a mechanism of or for a particular phenomenon; and it does
not seem to alleviate the problem of underdetermination. On the one hand,
in both Sections 6 and 9, I explicitly made sure to stay true to Glennan’s law
when defining both the aphid’s and the Buchnera’s relevant activities (and
hence the explanandum phenomenon). In the case of the aphid–Buchnera
symbiosis, it was not the delineation of the explanandum phenomenon that
solved the underdetermination, but an application of SYNCHR*. On the
other hand, this emphasis on the explanandum phenomenon does not set
mechanistic thinking apart from causal thinking. Nothing is a cause simplici-
ter. Every cause is a cause of something else. The same holds for our descrip-
tions of causal phenomena. Whether one variable is a cause of another
variable in Woodward’s sense, depends both on objective features of this
world and on how the respective variables are defined.37 Likewise, whether
one variable is a direct cause of another variable, depends on which other
variables we take into account. How we define our variables and which vari-
ables we do or do not take into account, partly depends on our human inter-
ests, on the phenomena we want to predict, explain, or control, and what we
want to use our knowledge for. In the case of symbiotic relations, for example,
issues of manipulation and control explicitly set the research agenda:
As well as being of general entomological interest, the mycetocyte
symbioses are potentially of great applied value. Many of the insects
that depend on their mycetocyte symbionts for normal growth and
reproduction are pests of agricultural or medical importance. They
include crop pests [. . .], timber pests [. . .], insects of public health
36 The suggestion that cases of underdetermination are cases where relevance should play a more
prominent role is due to an anonymous referee. I would like to thank him or her for pressing me
on this issue.
37 Woodward defends a realist position with respect to causation ([2003], pp. 118–23), but he also
explicitly stresses dependence of our causal conclusions on our choice of representation (passim)
and the role of pragmatics in causal explanation (pp. 226–33).
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importance. [. . .] To date, the requirement of these various groups for
microorganisms has not been exploited in pest management. (Douglas
[1998], p. 19)
The second issue is: what kind of relevance? Again, Craver is very explicit.
The type of relevance he has in mind is constitutive relevance as defined by the
mutual manipulability account (Craver [2009], p. 593, footnote 7). But as we
saw in Section 9, the problem of underdetermination seems insoluble when
we allow ourselves to use only the resources of the mutual manipulability
account. At the minimum, we also need methodological principles based on
the notions of parthood (STI—) and synchronicity (SYNCHR*) to try to solve
the problem.
In short, even though I welcome the role of pragmatic considerations,
human interests, and perspective in the context of mechanistic thinking, I
doubt these considerations set it apart from the context of causal thinking
and I deny that they can solve the problem of underdetermination. Relevance,
broadly construed, does and should play a prominent role both in the context
of interlevel experiments and in the context of etiological experiments.
13 Concluding Remarks
Let me briefly recapitulate. Craver takes the intralevel causal relations in
mechanisms as invariant under ideal etiological interventions. At the same
time, he offers a mutual manipulability account of the interlevel constitutive
relations. This gives rise to two conceptual problems. Problem #1: either con-
stitutive relevance implies causal relevance, or we need a set of principled
reasons why ideal interlevel interventions cannot be ideal etiological interven-
tions. Problem #2: if parthood is defined in terms of spatio-temporal inclu-
sion, the mutual manipulability account is prone to many counterexamples
and fails to provide a sufficient condition for constitutive relevance. Problem
#2 has a methodological counterpart: it may be hard to distinguish between
constitutive relevance and bidirectional causation on the basis of experimental
evidence (Problem #3). Partial, but fallible solutions to this problem have
been formulated, based on the notions of parthood (STI—) and synchronicity
(SYNCHR*).
In my opinion, these problems are of the utmost importance for all those
who account for a mechanism’s causal relations in terms of Woodward-style
invariance (such as Glennan [2002]; Woodward [2002]; Craver [2006], [2007];
Leuridan [2010]). Unless we find a better account of parthood, Problems #1
and #2 prompt us either to reject invariance as an appropriate account of
causation in the context of mechanisms, or to revise the concepts of ideal
etiological and/or ideal interlevel intervention, or to elaborate the mutual
manipulability account such that it includes a synchronicity requirement,
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or . . . to abandon the strict distinction between constitutive and causal
relevance.
I propose to take the last road. If we hold on to the central manipulationist
idea that causal relationships are distinctive in that they are potentially
exploitable for the purposes of manipulation and control, then constitutive
relationships are definitely causal. Causal relevance (sensu latu) thus comes in
two varieties: intralevel etiological relevance (or causal relevance sensu strictu)
and interlevel relevance. Given that the label ‘constitutive’ suggests the latter
cannot be causal, we should drop it.
Surely this will not magic away the above problems. There is a differ-
ence between interlevel relations and bidirectional etiological relations and
we do want our experimental practices to reveal such distinctions. But my
proposal makes clear that the difference in question is not as strict as
Craver and Bechtel claim it to be and that as yet we lack the means to spell
it out.
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Appendix
In this appendix, I show that if I is a Craverian ideal interlevel intervention,
satisfying (I1c)–(I4c), then it satisfies Woodward’s conditions for being an
ideal etiological intervention.38 Since Woodward treats these conditions
as both necessary and sufficient for being an ideal etiological intervention
and since he treats invariance under such interventions as both necessary
and sufficient for being a causal generalization, this result is even more dama-
ging to Craver and Bechtel’s claims that constitutive relevance is strictly dis-
tinct from causal relevance than the argument in Section 5.
Here is Woodward’s definition (subscripts are added to the conditions in the
interest of clarity, ‘w’ referring to ‘Woodward’;  and  are substituted for X
38 In line with my remark in Section 3, I will sidestep Woodward’s distinction between interven-
tions and intervention variables since it does not affect the argument.
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and Y; and in line with footnote 15, I will assume it makes sense to talk about
causal intermediates between I and  and  ):
I is an intervention variable for  with respect to  if and only if I meets
the following conditions:
(I1w) I causes .
(I2w) I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause . That is,
certain values of I are such that when I attains those values,  ceases to
depend on the values of other variables that cause  and instead depends
only on the value taken by I.
(I3w) Any directed path from I to  goes through . That is, I does not
directly cause  and is not a cause of any causes of  that are distinct
from  except, of course, for those causes of  , if any, that are built
into the I-- connection itself; that is, except for (a) any causes of  that
are effects of  (i.e. variables that are causally between  and Y) and
(b) any causes of  that are between I and  and have no effect on  
independently of .
(I4w) I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes  and
that is on a directed path that does not go through  (adapted from
Woodward [2003], p. 98).
Here is the proof. Suppose that I is an ideal interlevel intervention. Then,
first, it satisfies (I1w) by the general characterization of interlevel interventions.
Second, it also satisfies (I2w) by (I4c). Third, I satisfies a condition which is
slightly stronger than (I3w). By (I1c), it does not directly cause  . And by (I2c)
it does not change the value of any * that changes the value of , except via .
Therefore, it is not a cause of any causes of  that are distinct from  and that
are not built into the I-- connection. Fourth, I is (statistically) independent
of any variable Z that causes  and that is on a directed path that does not go
through , as required by (I4w). The reason is that any such Z is causally
independent of I (since by (I3w) any directed path from I to  goes through );
hence I is statistically independent from Z by (I3c).
In short, if I is an ideal interlevel intervention, it satisfies the (neces-
sary) conditions (I1c)–(I4c). Therefore, it satisfies the (necessary and sufficient)
conditions (I1w)–(I4w). Thus it is a Woodwardian ideal etiological intervention.
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